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FORUM 
HISTORIANS AND THE NEW ORIGINALISM: 
CONTEXTUALISM, HISTORICISM, 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
FOREWORD 
Martin S. Flaherty* 
INTRODUCTION 
Little appreciated, in an otherwise greatly appreciated opinion, is Justice 
Robert Jackson’s lyrical rejection of originalism in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.1  There, he waxed that “just what our forefathers did 
envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, 
must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph 
was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. . . .  [T]hey largely cancel each 
other.”2  He deftly underlined the point with a footnote demonstrating how 
two of the most prominent Founders, who were also two of the three 
personalities that made up “Publius” (the author of The Federalist)—James 
Madison and Alexander Hamilton—utterly disagreed with one another 
about the Constitution’s meaning as soon as major controversies arose.3 
Yet, as with Mark Twain, the announcement of originalism’s death has 
proven to be premature.  As this forum shows, whatever else originalism is, 
it is alive and well.  Fortunately, the Essays in this forum come from 
historians.  As such, the contributions issue from the very discipline on 
which originalism’s claims depend.  Precisely that insight serves as the 
dominant, though not necessarily unanimous, theme of this collection.  
From this insight comes ways to confine originalism to a possibly 
legitimate, but far more circumscribed, role than its adherents desire. 
Toward that end, this Foreword addresses three matters.  First, it 
considers why the use of history in constitutional interpretation is 
inescapable.  Next, it suggests that the Essays in this forum do not go far 
enough in debunking the idea of “public meaning” originalism as a serious 
 
*  Leitner Family Professor of International Human Rights, Fordham University School of 
Law; Visiting Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 
Princeton University.  My thanks to Chris Pioch for his invaluable research assistance. 
 
 1. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 2. Id. at 634–35 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 3. Id. at 635 n.1. 
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alternative to previous approaches.  Finally, the balance of this Foreword 
reviews the also perhaps inescapable misuses of history that constitutional 
interpretation invites and considers the type of misuse that public meaning 
originalism represents. 
I.  HISTORY TRIUMPHANT 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once wrote that “a page of history is worth a 
volume of logic.”4  Nowhere has that adage been applied more consistently 
than in the pages of the U.S. Reports.  Historical arguments have featured in 
constitutional interpretation from the Supreme Court’s earliest decisions.  
Just as Justice Jackson’s dismissal of originalism is overlooked in 
Youngstown, so too is Chief Justice John Marshall’s embrace of the 
approach in Marbury v. Madison.5  Typically, commentators focus on 
Marbury’s use of text and structure.  Yet there, almost in passing, Marshall 
justifies the primacy of constitutional law, stating: 
 That the people have an original right to establish, for their future 
government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to 
their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has 
been erected.  The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; 
nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated.  The principles, 
therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental.  And as the authority, 
from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are 
designed to be permanent.6 
Marshall offered no citations for the proposition, probably because he 
personally participated in the events on which he relied, one reason why 
this originalist aspect of Marbury evades attention. 
Two hundred years later, justices relying on history cite to Founding 
sources, and they do so obsessively, regardless of political bent.  Recent 
opinions relying heavily on the history of particular constitutional 
provisions include:  Zivotofsky v. Kerry,7 Medellín v. Texas,8 District of 
Columbia v. Heller,9 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,10 Boumediene v. Bush,11 
Printz v. United States,12 New York v. United States,13 Harmelin v. 
Michigan,14 Morrison v. Olson,15 INS v. Chadha,16 and others. 
As Jonathan Gienapp notes, originalism’s modern incarnation comes 
from the efforts of conservative advocates and scholars dating back to the 
 
 4. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
 5. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 6. Id. at 176. 
 7. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 8. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 9. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 10. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 11. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 12. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 13. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 14. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
 15. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 16. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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Reagan Administration.17  Though sometimes overlooked, progressive 
scholars and advocates in short order countered with originalist and/or 
historical arguments of their own.  So dominant has the turn to history been 
that Randy Barnett only slightly overstated his proclamation that 
originalism has triumphed.18  Given this reality, constitutional lawyers cede 
historical arguments to the opposing side at their peril. 
II.  THE PROMISE OF PUBLIC MEANING 
None of this is to say that originalism’s path to dominance has been easy 
or ultimately a good thing.  At every step it has met significant challenges.  
Public meaning originalism, which the Essays in this forum address, is 
simply the most recent attempt to salvage the approach from those 
challenges.  These Essays rightly suggest that the public-meaning gambit 
will not just fail to meet some of the more serious objections that 
originalism faces.  They also rightly suggest that, if anything, this new 
incarnation of the method robs it of whatever legitimacy it might otherwise 
claim.  If these responses have any weakness, it is that they do not venture 
far—or, more accurately, deeply—enough. 
The first assaults on modern originalism were mainly fought on the fields 
of theory.  Responding to Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Justice 
William J. Brennan, Jr. set the terms of popular debate, arguing that at the 
end of the day, constitutional interpretation should be about justice rather 
than democratic dead-hand control.19  Prominent constitutional theorists, 
sometimes grouped under the banner of “justice seeking,” elaborated 
Brennan’s objections.20  Among other things, they argued that the 
Constitution’s legitimacy lay not in the will of the long dead majorities who 
ratified its provisions, but rather in the justice and moral authority of the 
principles that those provisions enshrined.21  Just for this reason, theoretical 
opponents in originalism debates tended to talk past each other.  Either the 
Constitution rested on the democratic authority of “We the People,” 
expressed through ratification, or it rested on principles of fundamental 
justice.  Competing sets of these first principles tend to result in a stalemate. 
Enter the historians, whose objections tended to be less fundamental but 
more threatening.  It did not take long before those suspicious of Reagan-
era originalism noted that its practitioners attributed original intentions to 
the Founders that invariably supported modern conservative positions.  That 
suspicion only grew once legal scholars turned either to historians or to the 
 
 17. See generally Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching 
Symposium at Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in ORIGINALISM:  A QUARTER-
CENTURY OF DEBATE 55, 55–70 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007); Attorney General Edwin 
Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in ORIGINALISM:  A 
QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE, supra, at 47, 47–54. 
 18. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 
(1999). 
 19. Brennan, supra note 17, at 57–58, 70. 
 20. See Martin Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1565, 1565–66 
(1997). 
 21. Id. 
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historical sources themselves.  The result was several damning objections, 
even conceding originalism’s theoretical underpinnings. 
The first set of objections was what I long ago categorized as 
“procedural.”22  These stem from a proposition that all but one of the 
contributors to this forum take as a given.  That is, when a legal advocate 
invokes the authority of a separate discipline to add weight to her legal 
argument, it follows that the advocate has no choice other than to play by 
the rules of that separate discipline.  Take, for example, a claim about tort 
law based upon a scientific proposition.  The legal claim derives additional 
weight only to the extent that the scientific claim rests upon recognized 
scientific procedures.  To say, therefore, that the rules of one discourse 
should not be imposed upon another gets the matter exactly wrong.  The 
practitioners of one discipline—constitutional law—seek to strengthen their 
arguments with the conclusions drawn from another discipline—
constitutional history.  They do so on the belief that historically based 
arguments provide authority that legal assertions cannot alone.  The 
additional weight derives precisely because the two forms of discourse are 
different.  An argument for a “unitary” executive may proceed solely based 
on conventional legal materials, such as text or inference from structure.  
When, however, a supporter of that position further contends that the 
“Founding generation” in some way supported this position, assuming such 
support is a good and weighty thing, then it tends to matter whether the 
Founders actually did any such thing—especially when it turns out that they 
did not.23 
It follows that the external authority that history affords depends upon 
following at least the basic procedural rules that history demands.  These 
may be briefly stated.  As Jack Rakove24 and Saul Cornell25 in particular 
emphasize, first is a concern for context.  Without understanding how 
different the past can be, misconstruing words or deeds through modern 
eyes becomes almost inevitable.  A perhaps counterintuitive corollary is 
reliance on the secondary works of professional historians, who have the 
time and training to scour original sources that even legal academics do not.  
Only after this should anyone, especially lawyers, venture into the thickets 
of primary sources, and they should be scrupulous about reviewing all 
relevant material, broadly defined.  The need to cast a wide net raises a 
further basic stricture:  anyone consulting history must be open to the 
likelihood of complexity.26  Jack Rakove himself nicely captured the idea 
when he titled his book on the framing and ratification as Original 
 
 22. Martin Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. 
L. REV. 523, 554–55 (1995). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Jack Rakove, Tone Deaf to the Past:  More Qualms About Public Meaning 
Originalism, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 972–73 (2015). 
 25. Saul Cornell, “To Assemble Together for Their Common Good”:  History, 
Ethnography, and the Original Meanings of the Rights of Assembly and Speech, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 915, 917 (2015). 
 26. See Flaherty, supra note 22, at 550–52. 
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Meanings,27 plural.  By these standards, not surprisingly, much first-wave 
originalist work fared poorly. 
But the historical challenge did not end there.  Substantively, scholars 
and even judges pursuing sound historical method discovered just the type 
of complexity that a good historian would expect from a nationwide debate 
about an untested frame of government open to numerous interpretations.  
Consider, for example, separation of powers.  Here Justice Antonin Scalia 
set the terms for the initial originalist case by claiming that the Founders 
more or less all understood the precise scope of “Executive Power” in 
Article II, including the exclusive power to remove federal officers.28  
Several legal scholars ostensibly confirmed the historical case.  Studies 
adhering to even the most basic historical methods quickly revealed that no 
such Founding-era consensus existed.  While the Founders did generally 
embrace separation of powers as a basic idea, they wildly disagreed on what 
it meant with regard to numerous “details,” such as removal of federal 
officers.29 
Occasionally, the substantive challenges that historians and history-
minded advocates mounted went beyond demonstrating complexity and 
found consensus that was diametrically opposed to the positions that many 
conservative originalists put forward.  Perhaps the best example here is the 
Declare War Clause.30  Certain originalists sought to demonstrate that the 
original intent of the provision sought merely to give Congress the power to 
announce that the nation was formerly in a state of war, rather than the 
exclusive power to authorize the President to introduce troops into 
hostilities.  Closer historical scrutiny, however, did more than show simply 
that the Founding generation held many views on the subject that 
“cancel[ed] each other.”31  Rather, the overwhelming weight of secondary 
studies themselves, relying on both a reconstruction of historical context 
and close examination of the primary sources, concluded that there was a 
clearly dominant view of the Declare War Clause—to grant Congress the 
power to authorize the use of troops except in certain emergency situations 
during which it was not in session.32 
In the face of these challenges, originalists might have simply moderated 
their initial claim.  They might have conceded that history generally will not 
furnish one clear original understanding and that when it does, the 
understanding might not confirm the modern result that they expected or 
desired.  These sensible concessions, however, may have ceded too much 
ground to originalism’s “original vision.” 
 
 27. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS (1996). 
 28. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. at 703–04. 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 31. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–35, 635 n.1 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
 32. See, e.g., William M. Treanor, Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 
82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 715 (1997). 
910 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Perhaps for this reason, originalism instead rebranded itself in a way that 
claimed to obviate the challenges that issued from history as a discipline.  
This was a shift from “original intention” to “original understanding,” 
which ultimately came to be defined as a quest for the original public 
meaning.  The goal would no longer be to seek the subjective intentions and 
motivations of James Madison, James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, 
Gouverneur Morris, or other Founders, either at the ratification debates or at 
the closed Federal Convention.  That search got inevitably bogged down in 
just what historians prized:  placing individual Founders in the context of 
their day, looking at the numerous personalities who participated, and 
accepting the complexity and confusion that often resulted.  Public meaning 
promised to cut the historical Gordian knot.  The goal would now be to fix 
the meaning of a constitutional provision by asking how a literate member 
of the public would have understood its words at the time.  In theory, this 
approach might often require no more than consulting a contemporary 
dictionary to unlock the operative meaning of “executive,” “commerce,” or 
“due process.” 
Each of the contributions to this forum demonstrates that, when it comes 
to history’s demands, public meaning originalists can run, but they cannot 
hide.  Helen Irving correctly doubts whether judges are up to relying on 
history as a dispositive authority at all, but argues that because they will try 
anyway, they should be held accountable to some historical standards.33  
With prodigious sophistication, Jonathan Gienapp convincingly argues that 
attempts to base public meaning on linguistic philosophers such as Grice 
are, among other things, inapposite.34  Saul Cornell both practices and 
preaches rigorous historical method with a compelling account of the use of 
liberty poles during the Whiskey Rebellion and with not just a contextual 
approach, but also an anthropological approach, reviews contemporary 
attitudes—plural—toward free speech.35  Most simply, Jack Rakove rightly 
asserts that almost any historical claim that ignores context, inclusion, and 
complexity will not be credible and that seeking the range of meanings that 
a literate American might have attributed to the Constitution in 1788 or 
1791 is not different.36 
Each of these authors counters the public meaning narrative 
convincingly.  Yet there remains an even more basic objection:  What basis 
would there be to believe that the understanding of a randomly selected 
participant in either the framing or formal ratification debates of the 
Constitution would be any different from the understanding of a randomly 
selected, literate member of the general public? 
Consider this thought experiment.  Two New Yorkers and a Virginian 
walk into a bar.  The first New Yorker is Alexander Hamilton, the Virginian 
 
 33. Helen Irving, Outsourcing the Law:  History and the Disciplinary Limits of 
Constitutional Reasoning, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 957, 962 (2015). 
 34. Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and Holism:  Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 945 (2015). 
 35. See generally Cornell, supra note 25. 
 36. Rakove, supra note 24. 
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is James Madison, and the bar into which they walk is owned by the other 
New Yorker, Samuel Fraunces.  Assume they all read the first clause of the 
new Constitution’s Article II.  Hamilton, an advocate of a strong executive, 
reads it expansively, though not as expansively as many presidentialist 
originalists assume.  Madison, more circumspect, comes to read it more 
narrowly.  Each Founder takes the core meaning of the “Executive Power” 
vested in the President as implementing the laws passed by Congress.  
Hamilton, however, interprets it to mean a power to proclaim neutrality, 
though he gets there through an expansive reading of other specific grants 
of power in Article II.37  Madison soon makes clear that he opposes any 
such unwarranted expansion of what the Chief Executive may do.38  And 
what about Samuel Fraunces, our proxy for a literate member of the general 
public?  Without any specific information, we might speculate that he 
understands executive power as no more or less than enforcing the laws.  Or 
he might read it to include more additional powers, such as a power to 
proclaim neutrality, or an exclusive power to terminate treaties or remove 
federal officeholders.39 
The point is that there is no reason to think that, where the well-known 
Founders entertained a range of views on a provision, issue, or question, a 
literate member of the public at the time would have held any views outside 
that range.  In fact, given that the general public outnumbered the elite 
Founders by the tens of thousands, there is every reason to believe that the 
range of possible meanings literate members of the public had would have 
been broader, with idiosyncratic views at the margins.  And where the elite 
Founders might have agreed on one precise meaning, such as the 
requirement that a President be at least “thirty-five years old,” it is likely 
such a provision would have held the same meaning for the general public.  
Only if we assumed that the Framers at the Convention or the Founders at 
the ratification debates were speaking in a secret Masonic code known only 
to them would we have any basis to think that the range of subjective 
intentions that they had concerning a given provision would significantly 
diverge from the public meaning understood by publicans such as Samuel 
Fraunces.  At the end of the day, the Hamiltons and Madisons are merely a 
subset of literate members of the general public. 
All of which means that the challenges of finding the original intention(s) 
of the Framers at Philadelphia, the original understanding(s) of the 
Founders at the ratification debates, or the public meaning(s) of a provision 
that prevailed at a good ale house would yield appreciably different results.  
Each task is by definition historical—and valuable to originalists only to the 
extent it is historical—and so subject to historical procedures and 
 
 37. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and 
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 590–91 (2004). 
 38. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality Controversy:  Struggling over 
Presidential Power Outside the Courts, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 21, 38 (Curtis A. 
Bradley & Christopher H. Schroeder eds., 2009). 
 39. For an account of Fraunces, see KYM S. RICE, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
FRAUNCES TAVERN:  THE 18TH CENTURY (1985). 
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methodology.  That means doing the hard work of considering context, 
breadth, and, more often than not, complexity. 
The contributions to this forum nonetheless mount a powerful case 
against sparing originalism from historical scrutiny by way of public 
meaning.  They may not make the threshold point that the original 
intentions of the Founders would not likely diverge from the original 
understandings of the American public.  Even so, Cornell, Gienapp, Irving, 
and Rakove provide compelling reasons why the search for pubic meaning 
requires the same historical rigor as the quest for the Founders’ intentions. 
III.  HISTORIES ABUSED 
This collective refutation, however, might go further.  This forum 
suggests that public meaning originalism is bad, but does not explain how 
bad.  This question suggests flipping the usual point/counterpoint between 
originalists and their historian critics.  As noted, the story has largely 
consisted of originalists advancing claims, historians responding with 
skepticism, and originalists countering with modified approaches.  Yet 
historians might make a more effective contribution if they turned the 
tables.  In particular, historians might affirmatively chronicle different types 
of originalism to the extent they consistently do or do not fail to offer 
credible historical accounts to support their constitutional claims.  A more 
precise definition of the problem might in theory lead to more effective 
responses. 
With this in mind, let me advance certain pathologies identified 
elsewhere,40 but that will be further developed here.  First is what is widely 
known as “law office” history.41  This practice entails relying on historical 
sources, usually selectively, when they are perceived to support 
preconceived results.42  Typically, “law office” history involves using 
quotations and other materials often wrenched out of context.43 
More subtle, and today perhaps more prevalent, is what I once ago 
designated as history “lite.”44  The allusion to a then-popular beer campaign 
referred to historical arguments that were not as rigorous as “full-bodied” 
history, but were just as “satisfying” as any historian’s account.  History lite 
implies a genuine attempt to find historical answers, yet an attempt that is 
nonetheless undercut by the different demands of legal advocacy that Irving 
recounts.45  Legal advocacy leaves lawyers and judges little time to become 
immersed in a subject outside the law.  What applies to lawyers, moreover, 
also applies to legal scholars.  Law professors usually have to produce more 
 
 40. Martin S. Flaherty, Can the Quill Be Mightier than the Uzi?:  History “Lite,” “Law 
Office” and Worse Meets the Second Amendment, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 
2015). 
 41. Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History:  “Meet the New 
Boss, Same As the Old Boss”, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1098 (2009). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Flaherty, supra note 22, at 552–53. 
 45. Irving, supra note 33, at 961. 
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pieces on more varied topics in less time than their counterparts in history.  
They can do this because they typically submit their work to student-edited 
reviews rather than peer-reviewed journals.  The result is that there is very 
little to filter shoddy historical work.46 
Perhaps most pernicious, though ultimately more readily detected, is a 
further misuse of history that I more recently termed history “bullshit.”  The 
term as applied refers to a minor bestselling essay by Princeton philosophy 
professor Harry Frankfurt entitled, On Bullshit.47  Frankfurt rejected the 
common definition of the term as a false statement.  He argued instead that 
the idea had a more nihilistic meaning as a claim that was indifferent to 
whether truth or falsehood existed in the first place.  According to 
Frankfurt, cable and radio talk shows, social media, and other outlets create 
an insatiable need for bullshit because the premium is to fill time with 
claims that are merely provocative rather than true.48  Applied to 
originalism, the idea means an assertion about the past that ultimately has 
no concern for whether the claim is correct or incorrect, but instead 
considers whether the claim offers the kinds of originality, boldness, and 
cleverness that lead either to academic or Article III life tenure. 
CONCLUSION 
Where does “public meaning” originalism fall?  As is true of many legal 
inquiries, the answer is, “it depends.”  Consider three originalists who argue 
that “the right of the people to bear arms” had an original public meaning of 
an individual right to own and carry guns.  One does so already convinced 
that the Second Amendment protects such a right, and so genuinely reads 
“bear” and “carry” as synonymous, based either on a presentist reading or a 
source—perhaps a dictionary entry—that confirms the preconception, never 
bothering to subject the conclusion to more rigorous historical scrutiny.  
Such would be classic “law office” history.  Another originalist may 
attempt a real historical inquiry but, due to the constraints of time or 
perspective, simply fail to understand the importance of the eighteenth-
century militia system in relation to the concept of bearing arms for military 
use only after sufficient training and drilling.  Still, one more originalist 
may be indifferent to what Founding attitudes were altogether, but refer to 
them anyway en route to making a clever or provocative argument that 
includes an individual right to own pistols, assault weapons, or even 
drones.49 
The problem with public meaning originalism, as with its predecessors, is 
that it invites all three pathologies.  As each of the contributors makes clear, 
it offers a way to invoke history without actually doing history.  This 
promise makes it all too easy to believe that the past genuinely supports 
one’s present agenda, to believe that a good faith but insufficient inquiry 
 
 46. See Flaherty, supra note 22, at 552–53. 
 47. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005). 
 48. Id. passim. 
 49. For a concise, historically rigorous account of the Second Amendment by a 
nonhistorian, see MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT:  A BIOGRAPHY (2014). 
914 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
clearly supports a particular result, or to make provocative arguments that 
invoke the past on the theory that no one will or should look at the past too 
closely.  As such, public meaning originalism ought to be recognized for 
the many ways that the promise it offers is false.  Professors Cornell, 
Gienapp, Irving, and Rakove deserve kudos for helping to make this clear. 
